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Bottom-up versus Top-down
Campaigning at the Scottish
Independence Referendum 2014
La campagne du référendum écossais de 2014: la campagne officielle et la
campagne de terrain
Peter Lynch
1 The  proposal  to  use  the  referendum  device  to  achieve  a  mandate  for  Scottish
independence had been the policy of the Scottish National Party since devolution was
instituted in 1999.  In  office  after  2007,  the  party  had floated the idea of  a  two-step
referendum  on  enhanced  devolution  and  independence  but  its  success  at  the  2011
Scottish election gave it  the  majority  and the mandate  required to  press  for  a  one-
question referendum on independence. This outcome was not assured in 2011, but came
about through the medium of intergovernmental negotiations with the UK government
that led to the signing of the Edinburgh Agreement on 15 October 2012. Whilst delivering
the independence referendum contained a series of legislative and procedural challenges
for supporters of independence, there was also the difficulty of securing a Yes vote at the
referendum. The SNP’s approach to both devolution and independence up to 2011 had
been twofold. The party would seek to use the devolved parliament in Edinburgh as the
institution through which to govern effectively and the platform from which to hold an
independence referendum. If the SNP were able to show it was successful in government
in Edinburgh on policy delivery, this would boost voter confidence in relation to more
powers  for  Scotland  and  generate  support  for  independence.  Despite  this  strategy,
gaining a majority in 2011 and an independence referendum in 2014 were unexpected
developments for the SNP.
2 In  addition,  public  opinion  was  not  necessarily  easily  amenable  to  supporting
independence.  The independence option generally trailed behind popular support for
devolution as Scotland’s preferred constitutional preference. Even though the SNP gained
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a majority of the seats in 2011 on 45.4% of the vote, independence was only supported by
32% in the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey of the time, compared to 58% support for
devolution. Support for independence had also slipped as low as 23% in 2010.1 For much
of the campaign, the simple Yes/No/undecided opinion poll question found that Yes was
behind and frequently  substantially  by a  20% margin,  with a  feeling that  Yes  would
struggle to get as high as 40% at the referendum. Therefore, independence campaigners
were faced with the difficulty of “opinion-reversal” and the “uphill struggle” types of
campaigns at the referendum,2 meaning Yes had to convert large numbers of people to
support independence from a relatively low existing base, and keep them there for the
duration of  the long campaign.  Fighting a long campaign was something they hoped
would facilitate a Yes vote, in allowing Yes to generate momentum and build support,
whilst exhausting the negative campaigning tactics of its opponents.  The referendum
campaign  itself  ran  from  May  2012 to  September  2014,  with  Yes  opting  for  a  long
campaign and its opponents, especially Labour, largely choosing to fight a short, focused
campaign  from  May  to  September  2014.3 Yes  Scotland’s  decision  to  choose  a  long
campaign was effective in part as Yes achieved 45% and some of the structural realities of
the  political  and  media  environment  generated  some  interesting  strategies  and
organisational  responses  from  the  Yes  campaign  with  its  mixture  of  top-down  and
bottom-up campaign initiatives, as it finally grew into a mass social movement. It knew it
was too small in 2012 and therefore adopted a diverse approach to growing its support
from then until 18 September 2014. And, significantly, this growth continued after the
referendum itself as arguably, a mass movement for independence was created for the
first time in Scotland.
3 Two key points are worth making about the Yes campaign from the outset. First, the
campaign itself was a hybrid campaign, both by design and by default. It was partly the
result of an electoral campaign machine, recognisable to election-watchers around the
world,  with political  communications professionals and strategies,  political  marketing
through the media and online,  an electoral  database,  centralised fundraising and the
production of campaign materials. However, Yes was also a loose social movement that
implemented some of the central  Yes Scotland strategies and functions,  but was also
much more  free-flowing,  numerous  and autonomous  with  activities  similar  to  social
movement  repertoires  and  to  recent  anti-austerity  movements.4 Second,  the  Yes
campaign  created  a  political  movement  where  none  existed  before.  There  were  Yes
campaigns at the devolution referendums in 1979 and 1997, plus a range of Home Rule
pressure groups and organisations since 1918,5 but this was the first time that the pro-
independence forces actually became a broad social movement and built a grassroots in a
comprehensive way.  The 2014 referendum saw prominent roles for the SNP,  Scottish
Green Party  and Scottish  Socialist  Party,  but  it  also  saw the  involvement  of  tens  of
thousands of non-party indviduals and the creation of a large number of autonomous
organisations to promote a Yes vote like National Collective, Radical Independence and
Women for Independence.  Therefore,  though there was a clear No vote in 2014,  one
unintended consequence of the campaign was the creation of a mass movement in favour
of independence for the first time. This movement involved people politicised during the
campaign  who  then  became  mobilised  into  political  activism  and,  significantly,  the
mobilisation continued after the referendum itself. Yes lost on 18 September but lived on
through the dramatic growth in membership and popularity of the Yes parties plus the
continuation of many of the Yes local groups and organisations.
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4 The Yes campaign faced considerable negative structural realities at the outset of the
campaign that shaped its strategy and campaigning. First, the Yes parties were relatively
small – meaning a large SNP with 25,642 members and a place in government, but two
small parties in the shape of the Greens and SSP with modest resources and campaign
abilities. This was not seen to be large enough to win, therefore an alternative model was
required. Second, there was a feeling that the party approach would be ineffective as a
campaign strategy to make Yes less SNP-like, not least that the campaign needed to reach
out to voters outside the parties and also to Labour voters who generally opposed the
SNP: part of the tribalism of modern Scottish politics. Third, the media, in terms of the
printed  press,  were  likely  to  be  anti-independence  throughout  the  campaign.  Yes
therefore  had to  find a  way to  connect  with voters  that  recognised these  structural
realities. This situation fed the Yes social media campaign, which was extensive, but also
the support  for  grassroots  initiatives  that  sought  direct  contact  with voters  through
street campaigning and canvassing.  Yes sought to bypass the media to go directly to
voters through its local campaigners and ordinary supporters. At the same time, it sought
to  build  its  own  crowd-funded  media  of  bloggers,  news  websites  and  networks  on
Facebook and twitter.6 
 
Top-Down and Bottom-Up Campaigning – A Thousand
Flowers Bloom
5 When Chairman Mao raised the prospect of China allowing a “hundred flowers to bloom”
in 1956, he obviously didn’t foresee his phrase being subject to inflation and adopted by
Yes campaigners in Scotland in 2014.7 The adoption of the “thousand flowers” theme was
a consequence of the structural weakness and political environment for Yes, a sign of its
internal  diversity and also of  obvious contrasts that Scottish campaigners made with
Catalonia. Scotland’s quiet nationalism and mobilisation compared badly with the noisier,
public demonstrations by the Catalans with their mass rallies and capacity to mobilise
huge numbers of supporters well beyond the political parties. These activities provided
food for thought for Yes campaigners about how to reach beyond the parties to connect
with more voters, knowing that they faced an unsympathetic media. And, in a sense, this
explicitly meant how campaigners could reach voters who were partisans of the SNP’s
opponents – principally Labour – or not partisans at all, but part of an electorate that had
grown distrustful of political parties and institutions in recent years: something that was
a challenge for a movement seeking serious institutional change. Yes therefore sought to
campaign with and without politicians and parties, to focus on communities, families and
one-to-one campaigning and conversion efforts.
6 The challenge with characterising the Yes campaign simply is that it contained so much
in terms of  orthodox and unorthodox political  activism and elements  that  appeared
unfamiliar to political  activism in traditional UK party politics.  Within the broad Yes
movement you could find traditional elements of political campaigning like canvassing,
leafleting,  public meetings,  etc.,  as Yes groups engaged with the public in some very
traditional ways. There was an old school element to Yes campaigning as its grassroots
approach  breathed  new  life  into  street  work  as  opposed  to  the  types  of  electoral-
professional communications that came to dominate contemporary UK campaigning as it
was  transformed  into  people-less  political  marketing.  At  the  same  time,  Yes  made
extensive use of the media and particularly social media. Yes Scotland and organisations
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such as National Collective ran daily social media campaigns and some very effective
campaigns  across  the  referendum  that  connected  hundreds  of  thousands  of  voters.
Finally, there was a strong DIY element to Yes campaigning, with local groups organising
events, social media campaigning and literature. And that’s before considering music,
festivals, new media journalism, cartoons, performance poetry, art, football fans’ groups,
drop-in cafes,  graphic  design,  etc.,  and the wide expanse of  Yes  activities  outside of
electioneering that  sought  to  build  support  across  the long campaign from different
political  directions  –  from the  radical  left,  the  Greens,  cultural  organisations  or  the
women’s movement.  Events by local Yes groups often featured non-party figures like
authors and playwrights Alan Bissett and David Greig, poet Liz Lochhead, author Janice
Galloway, traditional musicians like Karine Polwart and Dougie McLean amongst many
others  as  Yes  took  on  a  cultural  festival  feel  with  story,  poetry  and  song.  National
Collective’s Yestival summer tour on 2014 contained a huge variety of cultural figures, old
and new.8
7 One prominent theme in research into political parties in recent decades has been the
rise  of  the  electoral-professional  party,9 as  parties  became  centralised,  political
communications machines that connected with voters through the mass media and direct
mailing  operations.  Political  campaigning  in  this  sense  became a  type  of  marketing,
practiced by professionals using focus groups and surveys to identify key voters in swing
seats,  with  campaigns  that  focused on party  positioning,  key  messages,  etc.,  so  that
elections became a form of retail politics.10 Closely related to these developments was the
atrophying of local party organisation and party membership.11 Quite simply, elections
became dominated by media campaigning, not by grassroots campaigning, unless you
happened to live in a key marginal constituency. This situation was very evident in the
UK, where political parties were seen to be in serial decline in recent years, albeit that
this  reality did not  affect  all  of  them:  both the SNP and UKIP were increasing their
membership in recent years. And, during the campaign itself, Yes grew at the grassroots
as  it  added  large  numbers  of  supporters  and  activists  to  its  ranks.  Events  like  the
Independence march and rally in 2013, the turning of the New Year in 2014 and George
Osborne’s decision to rule out Scotland sharing the pound after independence in early
2014 produced more Yes activity on the ground. The closing weeks of the long campaign
also  saw  many  people  becoming  active.  Significantly,  many  of  these  people  became
politically  active  for  the  first  time  and  came  from  outside  the  ranks  of  party
memberships.  And they came in large numbers so that Yes had tens of thousands of
activists  involved  on  the  ground  on  a  weekly  basis,  learning  political  campaigning
techniques and becoming familiar with the political terrain in their communities.
8 Of course, whilst the notion of an electoral-professional organisation gives some sense of
the hollowing out of political parties beneath the central organisation, it also infers that
there is a right way to do campaigning and a wrong way, and that some political activities
are  amateurish.  How  did  the  professional-amateur  divide  work  at  the  referendum
campaign? Whilst Yes had communications and marketing professionals,  it seemed to
lack electoral organisation staff aside from its electoral database team. Yet, the grassroots
and range of autonomous organisations in the broader Yes campaign were also a mix of
professional and amateur activists. The movement contained large numbers of activists
who were skilled in campaign organisation, use of social media, printing, graphic design,
etc., so that some of the grassroots activities defied description as amateur. Widespread
availability  of  digital  media  facilitated the  creation of  a  campaign army of  bloggers,
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Facebookers, tweeters and photographers. Campaigners also had time to learn new skills
over the long campaign. Often, this was a case of activists applying existing skills and
networks to the Yes campaign. The National Collective and its associated organisations
were a strong example of this – as it hosted events, including a national tour (Yestival),
ran theatre and cabaret  at  the Edinburgh Festival,  published books12 and magazines,
produced photo collections, cartoon books,13 acted as a forum for writers, journalists and
campaigns  to  publish  their  views  and  also  participated  in  street  campaigning.  Its
activities were promoted extensively through social media by the organisation and its
supporters with a considerable reach into the hundreds of thousands, meaning greater
than much of the traditional media in Scotland.14
9 When it comes to a central activity like campaign fundraising, the professional-amateur
dichotomy comes under pressure. Yes Scotland raised the largest sum of money of any
Yes organisation, yet it  was a weak fundraiser compared to Better Together by some
distance.  The  fact  that  Yes  was  not  such  a  successful  fundraising  organisation
undermined its campaigning efforts at the electoral level in particular when it came to
direct mail and voter targeting. One internal campaign document had outlined the goal of
raising 24 million and winning 65% of the vote. Instead, it only raised around 4.8 million
for  the  campaign.15 However,  other  components  of  the  Yes  campaign were  effective
fundraisers, albeit in smaller amounts. A large amount of Yes activity was crowd-funded
through  the  indiegogo  website  mechanism.  This  fundraising  platform  charged  a
percentage fee for the fund, but allowed funding to be raised centrally online, before
transfer to the campaign group. Such crowdfunding was promoted through social media
by Yes supporters and groups far and wide. Yes groups raised small amounts for specific
purposes  like  a  campaign shop or  mobile  advertising trailer  but  also  for  campaigns,
materials  and  broader  activities  from  festivals  to  websites  to  films.  Local  groups
crowdfunded but so did national organisations like National Collective, Radical Scotland
and Women for Independence. 
10 The  hybrid  Yes  campaign  was  also  typified  by  its  mixture  of  traditional  and  non-
traditional  campaigning.  Sure  enough,  it  excelled  at  social  media  campaigning,  with
multi-channel  campaigning  through  Facebook,  Google  plus,  twitter,  Kiltr  (a  Scottish
social  networking forum) instagram,  etc.  It  also made extensive use of  YouTube and
vimeo for campaign videos by the official  Yes campaign but also by a variety of Yes
groups and individuals. At times, it seemed everyone saw a future in online film. Events
were  often filmed for  upload later  and events  large  and small  were  streamed live.16
National  Collective’s  Yestival  became  available  online but  then  so  did  small  public
meetings  held  up  and  down  Scotland.  Yes  funded  a  large  number  of  infographic
production for Facebook and other channels,  which fed into graphic design,  T-shirts,
posters, mugs, badges, etc. As explained above, campaign funding was also raised through
social media.
11 However, allied to the technology was some very traditional campaigning, aimed directly
at  convincing  voters.  The  public  meeting/debate  made  something  of  a  comeback.
Sometimes these were organised affairs run through Eventbrite. More often, they were
just public meetings held in church halls, cafes and village halls. Hundreds were held,
with  tens  of  thousands  attending.  The  idea  of  the  public  meeting  was  to  attract
undecideds  to  discuss  the  issues.  However,  many  of  the  public  who  attended  were
probably already supporters of Yes or No at the referendum. Yet, such public meetings
helped  to  galvanise  Yes  in  particular  as  the  meetings  generated  new  activists  and
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supporters. So new converts to vote Yes may have been small, but the meetings were a
core  part  of  building  a  mass  movement.  Street  stalls  also  ran  regularly  to  provide
information about the case for Yes,  either in set weekly locations or in geographical
rotation depending on the local Yes group and geographic nature of the community.
These stalls had multiple functions: they were key to obtaining signatories for the Yes
declaration, generating support, building a network, distributing campaign materials and
for connecting with the public generally.  Face to face contact was central to the Yes
campaign through stalls but also through door to door canvassing. Armed with a copy of
the electoral  register,  campaigners would knock the doors to ask people where they
placed themselves  onto a  1-10 scale  (1  was totally  opposed to independence,  10 was
totally in favour). This data was then inputted to Yesmo, the campaign database to sift
out supporters and undecideds, who were then to be subject to further campaigning. The
use of the database also had a second function, that of voter registration. The database
was one of the keys to determining whether members of a household could vote at the
referendum and, for demographic reasons, many of the unregistered were likely to be Yes
voters.  The database was key to ensuring Yes was able to register as many voters as
possible though, in fact, campaigners visited colleges, job centres and bingo halls to find
unregistered voters, which didn’t rely on the electoral register or Yesmo database at all.
 
Yes at the Centre
12 The Yes campaign featured at least one defined centre in Yes Scotland. This umbrella
body was launched on 26 May 2012 as the official Yes organisation. It had an office in
Glasgow, a cross-party advisory board of  politicians and supporters,  permanent staff,
campaigning functions in terms of media, special media, organisation and electioneering.
It was created with a team of directors in 2012, but most of these were no longer in post
by 2014 as the organisation faced internal  problems which affected its  direction and
finances. These developments did not inspire confidence at the grassroots. The loss of
senior staff plus the manner in which the organisation had received large donations from
a couple of  SNP supporters who had won the Euromillions lottery probably deterred
supporters  from  donating  to  the  Yes  campaign  centrally,  with  consequent  negative
effects in its campaigning.
13 Yes Scotland had a number of strategies to develop support for independence. First was
the Yes declaration itself. The declaration was a symbolic device that supporters would
sign to demonstrate they supported independence. Supporters could sign online or in
person  at  Yes  stalls  and  events.  The  intention  was  for  Yes  to  recruit  one  million
signatories.  In the absence of official  membership processes,  this was effectively how
supporters joined Yes and became involved. The fact that Yes were able to announce that
they had achieved 1,001,186 signatures in 2014 was certainly a boost to the organisation
(announced on 22 August 2014). The collection of signatories was not a simple process
when completed manually through stalls and events. Individual signatories were often
unclear in terms of hand-writing and addresses and had to be checked with the electoral
register; moreover, there were signatories who could not be matched with the electoral
register, so getting to the million given that reality was impressive. However, the million
had practical as well as symbolic aspects. The declarations asked for names, addresses,
phone numbers and emails where possible, so that Yes centrally and locally were able to
contact supporters to seek campaign support, donations and circulate key messages. As
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individual Yes supporters were to be recruited as campaigners with their friends and
families, the collection of a huge email database was useful for circulating Yes briefings
on key issues like currency, the NHS, the job creation powers of independence, etc. It was
also used to prompt people to join local campaign events and share infographics on social
media like Facebook.
14 Yes Scotland also had a role in developing sectoral groups in support of Yes, which were
intended to  take on a  life  of  their  own once launched.  Staff  at  Yes  Scotland helped
organise a variety of  groups such as Sport  for Yes,  Academics for Yes,  Farming4Yes,
Generation Yes [Yes Youth and Students], Yes NHS, Teachers for Yes, Trade Unionists for
Yes, etc. The launch of these groups was aided by Yes, especially the organisation and
press  launches,  but  then  were  left  to  their  own devices  to  some  extent,  with  some
becoming formally independent of Yes and registering as separate organisations. What
the groups did was allow Yes to extend its social  and organisational reach into civic
society in key policy and professional areas so that the independence message was seen to
be relevant across a whole range of areas. Second, they generated Yes organisation within
key sectors,  so that medical staff,  lawyers,  care workers,  architects,  teachers,  etc.,  all
became advocates for independence in their own professions and used their expertise to
make the case for a Yes vote.
15 The third major role practiced by Yes centrally was in general campaigning through the
media and social media. Alongside the Scottish Government and the SNP, Yes was a key
producer of political discourse, policy and ideas at the referendum. These were promoted
through the traditional media but also through extensive use of social media in terms of
events, announcements, photo opportunities, the role of Yes spokespersons on TV and
radio, the production of Yes videos on YouTube for distribution on social media as well as
a  vast  number  of  infographics  for  social  media  distribution  and  sharing.  Yes  also
produced campaign materials in the shape of leaflets, booklets, posters and badges, with
lots  of  material  sold through the online Yes shop.  The central  organisation was also
responsible for booking newspaper and billboard advertising across Scotland. That’s not
to say that local Yes groups did not do these things: they did. Yes locally was extremely
creative in terms of producing campaign materials at all levels of campaigning, aided by
social media and new technology, to the extent that the referendum generated a cottage
industry of Yes campaign production (some of which continued after the event).
16 The final function of Yes Scotland as a central organisation was its role in creating and
operating the Yes database of supporters, Yesmo. This involved establishing and running
a database of all registered voters in Scotland from the autumn of 2013 to referendum day
itself.  The  database  logged  supporters,  opponents  and  undecideds  in  relation  to
independence  and  provided  a  platform  for  some  targeted  campaigning  during  the
referendum locally. It was also used for voter registration, encouraging turnout by postal
voters and then organising the ‘Get out the Vote’ organisation on referendum day itself. It
allowed local campaigners to target undecideds and allowed the central campaigners to
monitor levels of support for Yes/No throughout the campaign. As a targeting device it
had limited potential due to the weak capacity of Yes Scotland to exploit its own data and
target key voting groups centrally. Lack of electoral expertise and finance were issues
here, with Yes targeting of specific social groups coming very late in the campaign.
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Yes at the Grassroots
17 The grassroots level of Yes had numerous dimensions and no single model. Indeed, it was
characterised by its organisational diversity. Yes Scotland sought to generate Yes groups
across Scotland through the Yes Communities section of its office in Glasgow. Besides the
sectoral groups part of Yes, the local communities campaign was the most effective. The
organisation toured Scotland in the summer/autumn of 2012 to try to establish local Yes
groups around Scotland’s 32 local authority areas. In time, these groups mushroomed in
number and in geographical shape and there was considerable diversity amongst the 300
or  so  groups  established  on  the  ground.17 Some  local  groups  followed  constituency
organisational models – meaning they followed the 73 Scottish parliament and/or 59
Westminster constituencies.  Other groups followed local  community models based on
towns or villages. Some began as local authority groups and then decentralised into local
groups.  Some  overall  coordination  by  cross-boundary  groups  was  also  required.  Yes
Edinburgh for example was actually a shell organisation, which contained many local and
constituency-based groups beneath it. But it was able to act to coordinate monthly mass
canvassing across the city in 2014, which had the effect of delivering 150-250 campaigners
to  a  specific  area  of  Edinburgh  for  a  day’s  intensive  campaigning  (the  Yes  Super
Saturdays). Other local Yes groups and organisations like Radical Independence adopted
similar mass canvassing activities to target specific communities to register voters and
bring the case for independence onto people’s doorsteps.
18 The local groups were mostly self-starting and comprised of a range of people not just
SNP activists,  something that must be stressed. In some areas,  the local SNP was the
backbone of Yes, due to numbers of local campaigners, political experience and campaign
knowledge on the  ground.  However,  Yes  locally  was  notable  for  its  diversity  on the
ground  –  meaning  the  involvement  of  Greens,  Socialists  and  many  independents,
including  large  numbers  of  activists  who  were  first-time  campaigners  and  often
outnumbered  the  SNP contingent  in  the  local  campaign.  The  local  Yes  groups  grew
through mechanisms like the nationbuilder computer programme on the Yes Scotland
website where they organised and advertised local events, through Yes email “blasts” of
events to supporters and to the local emailing lists and Facebook pages of the Yes groups.
Local campaigning and events also generated new supporters and campaigners regularly
throughout the campaign as Yes grew at the local level in a very organic way. Local Yes
activity tended to generate more engagement from supporters so that activism tended to
snowball during the campaign.
19 The second main type of  grassroots  initiatives came with the creation of  a  series  of
autonomous Yes-supporting organisations during the campaign, from diverse sources.
These organisations became independently  registered with the Electoral  Commission,
with their own memberships, finances and internal organisational arrangements. They
were not established by Yes Scotland. For example, the Radical Independence Campaign
was launched at a conference in Glasgow in November 2012.18 It began as a conference of
ideas and discussions and then morphed into a  loose central  organisation with local
groups  that  became  involved  in  local  campaigning.  It  comprised  a  range  of  Greens,
Socialists  and  non-party  activists  from  social  movements  and  organisations  across
Scotland.  It  sought  to  create  its  own grassroots  and local  branches  grew during the
referendum campaign and stood at 21 in November 2014, especially in the major cities.19
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The organisation campaigned locally in a number of areas, especially in housing schemes.
It organised a series of mass canvasses of working class voters in Glasgow and Edinburgh
amongst other areas, intended to ensure voters were registered but also to talk to voters
about the case for independence. These latter aspects were key as the best demographic
support for Yes was amongst working class voters and, in some areas, these voters had
disappeared  from the  electoral  rolls  or  simply  stopped  voting.  Ideologically,  Radical
Independence also proposed a more radical form of independence that sought a greener,
more  redistributive  Scotland  that  would  be  a  republic  with  its  own currency.20 The
organisation saw its third conference in Glasgow attract 3,000 delegates spread across a
range of venues on 22 November 2014, on the same day as the new SNP leader Nicola
Sturgeon was speaking to 12,000 party members at the nearby Hydro arena. 
20 Second, and quite different to Radical Independence, was Business for Scotland, a pro-
independence business networking body that was created in March 2013 by six business
owners from the SME sector in Scotland. Through a series of business networking events,
fundraising, media and social media activities, the organisation grew to 3000 members.
Business for Scotland presented economic analyses and materials on the case for Yes,
challenging the arguments of the media and anti-independence businesses in Scotland on
currency, oil and gas, tourism, taxation, job creation, etc. The organisation produced its
own ambassador programme to increase its speakers and presence across Scotland to
take the case for independence to the SME community in particular.21 
21 Third, was Women for Independence, which was formed on 29 March 2012 and officially
launched in September 2012 as a broad women’s organisation for independence which
also campaigned on a wide range of issues around women’s representation in Scottish
political  life  and  the  workforce.22 The  organisation  grew  through  social  media  and
blogging and was launched with only 100 members. Its campaign efforts and social media
presence on International Women’s Day on 8 March 2014 gave the organisation a level of
prominence  in  the  referendum  campaign,  not  least  as  it  contained  a  number  of
prominent voices at a time when the Yes vote amongst women voters was seen to lag
significantly behind men. Figures from Women for Independence featured in the media,
and organised their own events and campaigning activities and networks.  The group
continued after  the referendum,  having morphed into an organisation that  hosted a
conference  with  1,000  participants  and  had  over  50  local groups  active in  political
campaigning.23 Local groups created shops, campaign group and began to get social and
political issues on the agenda for women, not least quotas and 50/50 representation as
well as the issue of a new women’s prison24. Significantly, each of these prominent groups
decided  to  continue  in  existence  after  the  referendum,  demonstrating  the  potential
longevity and resilience of the Yes movement. 
 
Conclusion
22 Though Yes lost the referendum, the long campaign had significant legacy effects, which
reflected the fact that a sizeable national movement had been formed for the first time.
The  hybrid  campaign  generated  a  range  of  new  organisations  that  continued
post-“indyref”, with diverse activities and strategies that used the online world to build
their networks and support bases. These organisations developed nationally and locally
through  a  variety  of  traditional  and  modern  methods  of  campaigning  and,  most
significantly, they actually grew and solidified rather than collapsed after 18 September.
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Further constitutional reform is very much on the agenda in Scotland and in the rest of
the  UK  as  the  referendum  helped  spark  constitutional  debate  and  demands.
Governments, parties and pressure groups became actively involved in post-referendum
discussions on further devolution. In addition, the politicisation and mobilisation effects
experienced during the referendum campaign actually continued afterwards. In spite of
the result, Yes activism continued after the referendum in a variety of ways. In the party
sphere, the SNP saw its membership boom from 25,642 on 18 September to 93,000 by early
2015 (the SNP computer system and office couldn’t cope with the demand). The Scottish
Greens surged from 1,200 members before the referendum to 7,057 on 12 October 2014
and struggled to send out membership packs to deal with the Green surge. The Scottish
Socialist Party had to find money to send out membership packs to 2,500 new members
who joined its ranks in the five days following the referendum. Organisations like Radical
Independence  and  Women  for  Independence  continued  after  the  referendum  with
conference  attendances  larger  than  during  the  campaign  itself  –  the  Radical
Independence conference had to move venue to a concert hall to accommodate 3,000
delegates.  Women  for  Independence  also  began  to  establish  local  groups  and  the
semblance of a branch network, as post-referendum activity continued to see localisation
strategies and network-building to create a larger organisation than existed during the
referendum campaign itself. Similarly, Yes groups continued to function, with strategic
discussions about approach to future activities, from possible Yes Alliance candidates for
the 2015 British general election to the future of the Yes movement at all levels, despite
the demise of Yes Scotland as a central organisation.
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ABSTRACTS
The Scottish independence referendum of 2014 saw one of the longest political campaigns in
modern UK politics. The referendum saw the formation of a hybrid Yes campaign that combined
modern campaigning techniques with a large, activist grassroots that established a range of new
political  organisations.  Not  only  did  these  organisations  continue  to  develop  after  the
referendum itself, but they contributed to the formation of a broad social movement in favour of
independence for the first time in Scotland.
Le référendum écossais de 2014 a été précédé de l’une des plus longues campagnes politiques de
l’ère moderne au Royaume-Uni.  Celle-ci  s’est  notamment caractérisée par la formation d’une
campagne pour le « oui » hybride, qui a mêlé techniques de campagne modernes et une large
base activiste à l’origine de la création de nouvelles organisations politiques. Non seulement ces
organisations ont continué à se développer après le référendum, mais elles ont aussi contribué à
la mise en place d’un vaste mouvement social en faveur de l’indépendance pour la première fois
dans l’histoire de l’Écosse.
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